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INDIA’S TRYST WITH TRIPS:
THE PATENTS (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2005
Shamnad Basheer*
ABSTRACT
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 introduces pharmaceutical product patents
in India for the first time. This Act attempts to balance out competing interests of a
variety of stakeholders, including domestic generic medicine producers, foreign
multinational pharmaceutical companies and civil society groups concerned with
access to medicines. Although this dexterous manoeuvring around competing interests
deserves praise, the net result of such a compromise has been a lack of clarity in the
law.
While highlighting the key aspects of the 2005 amendments and this lack of clarity,
this article also focuses on the vexed issue of the likely impact of the new regime on
access to medicines. It notes that the provisions as they stand now could be interpreted
in a manner that would leave considerable scope for the continued production of
some generics. Whether these provisions would be so interpreted remains to be seen.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The controversial Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 (hereinafter “the
2005 Act”) was India’s last step towards achieving complete TRIPS
compliance.1 This Act has had a fairly long innings. It began as the Patents
(Amendment Bill), 2003 (hereinafter “the Bill”) under the BJP (Bharatiya
Janata Party) government. The Bill lapsed owing to a change in government
at the Centre and the consequent dissolution of the Lok Sabha (India’s lower
house of Parliament).
The new Congress-led coalition government endorsed the Bill - however,
since they were unsure of whether it would go through Parliament in time to
meet the TRIPS deadline of January 1, 2005, they had it
passed as a Presidential Ordinance.2 Owing to pressure from the Left
1

In order to comply with TRIPS, the Patents Act, 1970 (India) had been amended twice
earlier by the Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999 and the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002.
2

Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 [hereinafter “the Ordinance”].
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parties,3 changes were made to the Ordinance and cleared by the Parliament
in the third week of March as the Patents (Amendment) Bill, 2005. After
receiving Presidential assent and being published in the official gazette, it
finally came into force with retrospective effect from January 1, 2005.4
The introduction of product patents for pharmaceutical inventions and
the consequent threat to an internationally renowned generic industry that
has thus far ensured the supply of affordable drugs spurred widespread protests,
both nationally and internationally, to an extent never before witnessed in
the annals of intellectual property law making in India. The result is an Act
that attempts to balance the competing interests of a variety of stakeholders,
including domestic generic medicine producers, the domestic research and
development community, foreign multinational pharmaceutical companies,
civil society groups concerned with access to medicines and intellectual
property lawyers.5 Although this delicate balancing deserves some applause,
the unfortunate fall-out has been the hasty introduction of provisions that go
against the grain of time tested patent law principles and are likely to provide
excellent fodder for litigation.
II. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2005 AMENDMENTS
This note highlights some of the main changes brought about by the
2005 Act and reflects on some of their broader implications. In particular, the
note focuses on the introduction of product patents for pharmaceutical
inventions and the controversial issue of how this change is likely to impact
access to medicines.
A. Product Patents for Pharmaceutical Inventions
The most prominent and controversial change has been the deletion of
section 5 of the Patents Act, 1970, thereby paving the way for product patents
3

The Communist Party of India, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), the Revolutionary
Socialist Party and the Forward Bloc are leftist parties supporting the ruling coalition
government.
4

The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 was published as law in the Gazette of India on
April 5, 2005.
5

See F.M. Abbott, Beginning of a New Policy Chapter: A Hopeful Way Forward in Addressing
Public Health Needs, F IN . E XPRESS , Apr. 6, 2005, http://www.financialexpress.com/
fe_full_story.php?content_id=87112 (last visited Oct. 15, 2005).
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in the area of pharmaceutical and other chemical inventions. Section 5 of the
Patents Act, 1970 (as it stood after the 2002 amendments) had provided that,
in the case of inventions being claimed relating to food, medicine, drugs or
chemical substances, only patents relating to the methods or processes of
manufacture of such substances could be obtained.
This deliberate strategy of denying product patent protection to
pharmaceutical inventions is traceable to the Ayyangar Committee Report, a
report that formed the very basis of the Patents Act, 1970.6 The Committee
found that foreigners held between eighty and ninety percent of Indian patents
and that more than ninety percent of these patents were not even worked in
India. The Committee concluded that the system was being exploited by
multinationals to achieve monopolistic control over the market, especially in
relation to vital industries such as food, chemicals and pharmaceuticals.
Medicines were arguably unaffordable to the general public and the drugprice index was rising rapidly. The Committee therefore recommended that
certain inventions such as pharmaceutical inventions, food and other chemical
inventions be granted only process patent protection.7 India’s well-developed
generic industry today is testimony to the farsightedness of this report.8
Quite naturally, it is feared that with the introduction of product patents
for pharmaceuticals, there will be a steep rise in drug prices and an adverse
impact on access to important drugs.9 The multinational pharmaceutical
6

N.R. AYYANGAR, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE PATENTS LAW (1959) [hereinafter AYYANGAR
REPORT].
7

Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provision in the TRIPS
Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 518 (1996).

8

In 2003, the size of India’s pharmaceutical market was estimated at US$4.9 billion. This
constitutes about 1% of global pharmaceutical sales and about 10% of the global generic
market. Today, India is among the top five bulk drug manufacturers of the world and has the
largest number of US FDA-approved manufacturing facilities outside the USA. India is also
the fourteenth largest exporter of drugs in the world and exported drugs worth $3.2 billion to
more than 65 countries. See SUDIP CHOUDHURI, R & D FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NEW DRUGS FOR
NEGLECTED DISEASES: HOW CAN INDIA CONTRIBUTE? 37-48 (2005) (discussing recent trends in
spending on research and development of pharmaceutical products and noting the importance
of public-private partnerships to address market failure in the development of drugs for
neglected diseases).
9

See, e.g., SHUBHAM CHAUDHURI ET AL., ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL PATENT PROTECTION
PHARMACEUTICALS: A CASE STUDY OF QUINOLONES IN INDIA 43 (2004). See also UNCTAD
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industry, on the other hand, argues that such patents are essential to encourage
innovation and help the transition of domestic pharmaceutical companies
from copycat generics to innovative R&D companies.10 They argue that this
will serve India’s interests better in the long run and that there are adequate
safeguards in the patent regime and other laws to curb a sharp rise in drug
prices.
B. Software Patentability
Section 3(k) of the Patents Act, 1970 excluded “a computer programme
per se” from the scope of patentability. This exclusion met with conflicting
interpretations at the patent office, with some examiners granting patents to
software combined with hardware or software with a demonstrable technical
application of some sort.11 The 2004 Ordinance therefore qualified this
exclusion by stating that software with a “technical application” to industry
or when “combined with hardware” would be patentable.12 Owing to vigorous
opposition from the free software movement,13 this provision was removed
from the 2005 Act. The earlier position under the Patents Act, 1970 that a
computer programme per se is not patentable now prevails.

India Programme, Product Patents: Implications for Pharmaceutical Industry and Consumers, at
http://www.unctadindia.org/MeetingOnProductPatents-ImplicationsForPharmaceutical
Industry-April04-2005_Presentation.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
10

Patent protection for pharmaceutical products will provide India’s scientists with incentives
to discover and develop new life-saving drugs. See PhRMA, PhRMA Welcomes Passage of
Patent Bill in India, at http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/23.03.2005.1157.cfm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2005).

11

“According to sources, over 150 patents on ‘technical effects of software’ had been granted
in the country even prior to the December Ordinance. These patents were granted despite
the legal ambiguity that had prevailed prior to issuance of the Ordinance.” See Software Patents
under Ordinance Face Reversal, FIN. EXPRESS, Mar. 29, 2005, http://www.financialexpress.com/
fe_full_story.php?content_id=86454 (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
12

Section 3(b) of the Ordinance excluded “a computer programme per se other than its
technical application to industry or a combination with hardware”.

13

See Free Software Foundation, Representation Made by the Free Software Foundation of India
to the Government of India to Immediately Withdraw the Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004,
at http://fsf.org.in/representation/representation.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
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Interestingly enough, a draft of a recent manual of the Patent Office that
attempts to lay down guidelines to interpret the Act arrives at a conclusion
that is similar to what the Ordinance provision sought to achieve. It notes:
The statute excludes from patentability the software per se. The inventions
relating to the application of the computer program or software is [sic] held
patentable under the Indian Patent Act, 1970 when claimed in combination
of hardware and software components of a computer which provide a
“technical advancement” over the prior art. It is necessary for the applicant
to describe the “technical contribution” to the prior art when the invention
involves software. The technical problem, which needs to be solved by the
invention, should be sufficiently described as to how the hardware is
controlled by the software to overcome the previously described problem.
[sic] The “technical character” of the invention should be brought out
clearly in the claims.14
C. Problematic Definitions
An unfortunate fallout of a hasty legislative process has been the
introduction of definitions that not only go against the grain of time-tested
patent law concepts but also defy logic. The key ones are elucidated below:
1. ‘New Invention’
The Patents Act, 1970 defines the term ‘new invention’ as
any invention or technology which has not been anticipated by publication
in any document or used in the country or elsewhere in the world before
the date of filing of a patent application with complete specification, i.e.
the subject matter has not fallen in public domain or that it does not form
part of the state of the art.15
It appears that the intent behind this provision is to define a ‘novelty’
standard - which, along with ‘non-obviousness’ (or ‘inventive step’) and ‘utility’
(‘industrial applicability’), are the three prerequisites for ‘patentability’.16
14

PATENT OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 156 (2005). The manual,
however, cautions, “The contents of this manual including the guidelines are merely for the
purpose of illustrations and not meant for legal purposes. In case of any conflict, legal provisions
of the Patents Act will prevail.”
15
16

Patents Act, 1970, § 2(1)(l), amended by Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005.

Most patent regimes provide that in order to be patentable, an invention has to be new,
non-obvious (to a person skilled in the art) and industrially applicable.
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However, a term such as ‘new invention’ raises the question of what an
‘invention’ is in the first place. Section 2(j) defines an invention as “a new
product or process involving an inventive step and capable of industrial
application”.17 Since ‘new’ is already a part of the term ‘invention’, introducing
a term such as ‘new invention’ to define a novelty standard is circular and
makes for shoddy drafting. A clearer way of doing this would have been to
define the term ‘new’ as found in the term ‘invention’.
The ‘new invention’ definition suffers from yet another infirmity. While
it appears to endorse an ‘absolute’ novelty ground, the Act still retains a
‘relative’ novelty ground in section 25. Section 25 stipulates that a patent
application can be opposed on the ground that the invention was “publicly
known or publicly used in India before the priority date of that claim”. To this
extent, the ground for opposition is based on ‘relative novelty’, i.e. the
invention should be known or used in India, whether or not it is so known or
used in any other part of the world. The new definition under the 2005 Act
however provides for ‘absolute’ novelty - in order to qualify as a ‘new invention’,
the said invention should not have “been anticipated by publication in any
document or used in the country or elsewhere in the world”.18 (emphasis supplied).
Consider an application for invention X in India, where the said invention
had already been used in China at some earlier point in time. It would appear
that such application could be refused by the patent office on the ground that
the invention had been used in China and is not therefore a ‘new invention’.
However, at the stage of opposition, a third party cannot take up this ground
under section 25, since the invention had never been publicly used in India
before the priority date of the claim. This difference in standard seems odd,
given that an interested third party is more likely to be aware of a foreign use
of the invention in question than an Indian patent examiner.19
2. The ‘Inventive Step’ Test
The 2005 Act makes a critical change to the earlier ‘non-obviousness’ or
‘inventive step’ test. The definition now reads:
17

Patents Act, 1970, § 2(j).

18

Patents Act, 1970, § 25, as amended by Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005.

19

More often than not, a third party who opposes a patent application is a competitor of the
applicant.
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‘inventive step’ means a feature of an invention that involves technical
advance as compared to the existing knowledge or having economic
significance or both and that makes the invention not obvious to the person
skilled in the art.20
As can be seen from this definition, while the fundamental yardstick for
measuring an ‘inventive step’ remains that which is “not obvious to a person
skilled in the art”,21 a requirement that the invention involve a ‘technical
advance’ or have an ‘economic significance’ of some sort has been added.
This change in the standard seems odd, given that the very purpose of
the ‘inventive step’ criterion is to determine whether an invention sufficiently
advances the technical arts so as to warrant an exclusive right. This is no
doubt achieved in an optimal manner by the simple test of whether the
invention, though novel, is non-obvious to a person skilled in the art.22 By
itself, the non-obviousness test is a difficult one to apply - additional criteria
such as ‘technical advance’ and ‘economic significance’ only further the
complexity. Contrary to suggestions by some commentators, the addition of
‘technical advance’ or ‘economic significance’ to the ‘non obviousness’ test
does not dilute the ‘inventive step’ requirement - on the contrary, it is
susceptible to being interpreted in a manner that renders it more onerous to
satisfy.23
Further, ‘economic significance’ seems to be more of a ‘utility’ or ‘industrial
applicability’ standard. By including such a criterion within a ‘non-obviousness’
or ‘inventive step’ standard, the Act creates considerable uncertainty. As a
commentator observes: “It interferes with the time-tested principles of patents
20

Patents Act, 1970, § 2(1)(ja), as amended by Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005.

21

The earlier section 2(ja) defined ‘inventive step’ as “a feature that makes the invention not
obvious to a person skilled in the art.”
22

In so far as the term ‘person skilled in the art’ is concerned, it may be worth noting that
Lord Hoffman was critical of what he termed “anthropomorphic conceptions of justice” and
“the varied cult of imaginary and sometimes improbable people invented by the law to embody
concepts like ‘reasonableness’, ‘business efficacy’ and ‘lack of inventiveness’.” Biogen Inc. v.
Medeva plc, [1997] RPC 1.
23

See, e.g., K.M. Gopakumar & Tahir Amin, Patents (Amendment) Bill 2005: A Critique,
40(15) ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1503, 1504 (Apr. 9, 2005) (“Thus the definition dilutes the
requirements of an inventive step and broadens the existing provision to the benefit of patent
holders.”)
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law, and in that process has created a new definition that can lead to loose
interpretations.”24
3. ‘Pharmaceutical Substances’
The term ‘pharmaceutical substances’ has been rather strangely defined
in section 2(1)(ta) as “any new entity involving one or more inventive steps”.
Defined in such a broad way, one is forced to query: would a mobile phone
that deploys advanced technology be a pharmaceutical substance if it is shown
that such entity is new and involves one or more inventive steps?
What is even more perplexing about this definition is the fact that the
term ‘pharmaceutical substance’ does not find mention anywhere else in the
Patents Act.25 In the absence of such a term in the Act, one wonders why the
legislature, in all its wisdom, did not see fit to clarify this concept.
4. The ‘New Use’ Exclusion
Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970 excluded a “new use for a known
substance” from the ambit of ‘invention’. The 2005 Act has expanded on this
exception by providing that “the mere discovery of a new form of a known
substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of
that substance” would not be patentable. It then states (via an explanation to
the section) that salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, etc. shall be
considered as the same substance unless they “differ significantly in properties
with regard to efficacy”.
The introduction of a new definition for the term ‘substance’ through
the explanation above would make for some nuanced interpretative battles.
If, for example, X1 is a polymorphic26 form of X, then would a showing of
24

M. Pillai, India's Patents Bill, 2005 - Is It TRIPS Compliant?, M ONDAQ N EWSL .
(Mar 31, 2005), at http://www.mondaq.com/i_article.asp_Q_articleid_E_31717 (last visited
Oct. 26, 2005).
25

Section 92A, which deals with compulsory licences in the context of exports to countries
with minimal manufacturing capabilities, uses the term ‘pharmaceutical products’. However
this term is used in a different sense than ‘pharmaceutical substances’, as is made evident by
the fact that it is defined in section 92A itself. The absurd definition in section 2(1)(ta)
cannot therefore apply to ‘pharmaceutical products’ under section 92A.

26

A polymorph is “a solid crystalline phase of a given compound resulting from the possibility
of at least two crystalline arrangements of the molecules of that compound in the solid state.”
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increased efficacy for X1 change it to a new substance (as suggested by the
explanation to the section)?27 In short, at what point would a showing of
increased efficacy change a ‘new form’ of an existing substance to a new
substance altogether?
In order to answer this question, one has to first address the issue of what
exactly the term ‘efficacy’ means. Would this term be construed in a manner
similar to how a drug approval agency would construe it?
It is interesting to note in this connection that this provision in the 2005
Act, which finds no parallel in any other patent legislation in the world, has
been copied from a European Directive dealing with drug safety regulation.
Article 10(2)(b) of Directive 2004/27/EC defines a ‘generic medicinal product’
as
a medicinal product which has the same qualitative and quantitative
composition in active substances and the same pharmaceutical form as the
reference medicinal product, and whose bioequivalence with the reference
medicinal product has been demonstrated by appropriate bioavailability
studies. The different salts, esters, ethers, isomers, mixtures of isomers,
complexes or derivatives of an active substance shall be considered to be
the same active substance, unless they differ significantly in properties
with regard to safety and/or efficacy. In such cases, additional information
providing proof of the safety and/or efficacy of the various salts, esters or
derivatives of an authorised active substance must be supplied by the
applicant. The various immediate-release oral pharmaceutical forms shall
be considered to be one and the same pharmaceutical form. Bioavailability
studies need not be required of the applicant if he can demonstrate that the
generic medicinal product meets the relevant criteria as defined in the
appropriate detailed guidelines.28
2 W.C. MCCRONE, PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY OF THE ORGANIC SOLID STATE 725 (David Fox et al.
eds., 1965).
27

Whether such a determination would make any practical difference is debatable, as both
the new ‘form’ as well as the new ‘substance’ would merit patent protection as a product.
28

Directive 2004/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004
amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products
for Human Use, (2004) O.J. (L 136) 34.
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As one can well appreciate, blindly transposing a provision that operates
within the context of a drug regulatory regime to a patent regime can pose
problems. For one, it makes it more likely that the term ‘efficacy’ would be
construed in a drug-regulatory sense - consequently, the requirement would
be a difficult one for most patent applicants to satisfy. Pharmaceutical
companies generally file patent applications at the initial stage of discovery of
a drug; it is only much later in the development process that clinical studies
(phase III) are conducted to gather information pertaining to the therapeutic
efficacy of the drug. The requirement of information on ‘efficacy’ at the stage
of filing a patent application is therefore an onerous one.29
If, on the other hand, the term ‘efficacy’ were to be construed in a liberal
manner to include even a general hint of an added advantage in using the
new form, it is possible that a good number of formulations would qualify as
new substances upon the showing of an increased efficacy.
The amended section 3(d) appears to be limited to only new forms that
demonstrate an increase in known efficacy. It does not, therefore, apply to a
case where the new form is found to have a completely different use (and not
just an increased efficacy vis-à-vis the known use). If the intention behind
this provision is to heighten the obviousness standard and weed out frivolous
and fairly obvious patents, this seems a rather illogical result, as a new use for
a new form is certainly more inventive than a mere showing of an increase in
known efficacy.
As with the problematic definition of ‘inventive step’ discussed above,
this provision is likely to provide an excellent platform for “meticulous verbal
analysis in which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to indulge”.30
29

“The task of proving efficacy is much more difficult, expensive, and time-consuming than
the task of proving safety.” The Independent Institute, History of FDA Regulation: 1902Present, at http://www.fdareview.org/history.shtml. Another commentator notes: “Thanks to
a 1963 law, the FDA requires pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers to prove
that new drugs and devices are both safe and effective - but the agency has refused to give a
clear definition of efficacy.” James Bovard, Bureaucratic Tyrants, 25(23) CONN. L. TRIB. 15
(June 7, 1999).
30

This widely quoted sentiment of Lord Diplock was expressed in the context of patent claim
construction and the laying down of what commonly came to be referred to as the doctrine of
‘purposive construction’. Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1982] RPC 183,
243.
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D. Pre-Grant/Post-Grant Opposition
The Patents Act, 1970 is endowed with a fairly robust pre-grant opposition
mechanism. It provides for several grounds on which a patent could be opposed
including the lack of novelty, inventive step or utility (the traditional
patentability criteria) or that the claimed invention does not fall within eligible
subject matter or that the specification does not disclose the source or
geographical origin of biological material used for the invention.31
The 2005 Act has introduced a post-grant opposition mechanism for the
first time. Within a year of the patent being granted, a ‘person interested’ can
challenge the issued patent on grounds that are identical to the grounds
available at the pre-grant opposition stage.32 The key difference between the
pre-grant and the post-grant opposition mechanism appears to be that while
‘any person’ could challenge at the pre-grant stage, the challenger has to be a
‘person interested’ at the post-grant stage.
A competitor who fails to challenge a patent application at the pre-grant/
post-grant stage has a further opportunity - he or she can seek revocation of
the patent under section 64 of the Patents Act.33 Here again, the grounds that
could be cited for revocation (whether by a direct petition to the Controller
or as a counter-claim during infringement proceedings) are broadly similar to
that available at the pre-grant and post-grant stage. This combination of a
pre-grant opposition mechanism, a post-grant opposition mechanism and a
revocation mechanism makes the regime a very effective one for filtering out
frivolous claims.34
E. Compulsory Licensing Regime
This is one area where there have been major changes, both substantive
and procedural.
1. Automatic Compulsory Licences for Mailbox Applications
The biggest substantive change has been the addition of a new ground
for compulsory licensing. As is well known, India amended the Patents Act
31

Patents Act, 1970, ch. V (§ 25-28).

32

Patents Act, 1970, § 25(2), as amended by Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005.

33

In much the same way as the post-grant opposition mechanism, it has to be a ‘person
interested’ who initiates the challenge and not just any person.
34

Patents Act, 1970, § 64.
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in 1999 to provide that applications claiming pharmaceutical inventions would
be accepted and put away in a mailbox, to be examined in 2005. These
applications are commonly referred to as ‘mailbox applications’. This
amendment was in pursuance of a TRIPS obligation aimed at preserving the
novelty of pharmaceutical inventions in those developing and least developed
country (LDC) members that did not grant product patents for pharmaceutical
inventions in 1995.35 By virtue of this ‘mailbox facility’, applications would
be judged for ‘novelty’ on the basis of the filing date and not with reference to
2005, the year in which product patents were first incorporated into the patent
regime.
The Act provides that in the case of those mailbox applications that
result in the grant of a patent, an automatic compulsory licence would issue to
those generic companies that made a ‘significant investment’ and were
‘producing and marketing’ a drug covered by the mailbox application prior to
2005.36 Such licence is subject to a payment of a ‘reasonable royalty’. However,
no specific yardstick is provided to determine ‘reasonableness’ and this term is
likely to lead to disputes in coming years.37 Perhaps one will have to go by the
broad criteria in section 90 of the Act - that while computing the royalty

35

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. In the
WTO dispute filed by the United States against India for a failure to comply with this provision,
the WTO appellate body held that India was obliged to provide a sound legal mechanism for
an interim mailbox arrangement. See WTO Appellate Body, India: Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997), available
at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=&doc=D%3A%2FDDF
DOCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F50ABR%2EWPF%2EHTM. The Patents
(Amendment) Act, 1999 was introduced as a response to this ruling, and was in fact given
retrospective effect from 1995, the date on which India was supposed to have instituted the
mailbox facility under TRIPS.
36
37

Patents Act, 1970, § 11A, proviso, amended by Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005.

It is pertinent to note that during the Parliamentary debates, a number of members suggested
that a specific royalty rate or a ceiling on the royalty rate be fixed (see specifically comments
by Mrs. Maneka Gandhi and Mr. Suresh Kurup). However, at the time of voting, the clause
was adopted with the words ‘reasonable royalty’ and no specific percentage was fixed. See Lok
Sabha Debate, Mar. 22, 2005, at http://164.100.24.230/Webdata/datalshom001/dailydeb/
22032005.htm.
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payable, one shall have regard to “the nature of the invention, the expenditure
incurred by the patentee in making the invention or in developing it and
obtaining a patent and keeping it in force and other relevant factors”.38
It will be interesting to see how this new provision pans out in the years
to come. It is reminiscent of the ‘licence of right’ provisions under the earlier
patent regime. Inventions pertaining to food and medicine were subjected to
an automatic endorsement (i.e. they were deemed to be so endorsed) with a
‘licence of right’ after a period of three years from the date of sealing of the
patent.39 In other words, any person interested in working the patented
invention, endorsed with a ‘licence of right’ could have a licence as of right,
without needing to establish any specific grounds for it.40
2. Compulsory Licences for Exports
In order to incorporate what is commonly referred to as the Paragraph 6
Decision41, the Ordinance introduced section 92A, which provides for
compulsory licences to enable exports of pharmaceutical products to those
countries with no manufacturing capacity of their own. Unfortunately, this
suffered from a handicap - the provision required that the exporter obtain a
compulsory licence from the importing country as well. In the process, the
provision failed to cater to those situations where there was no patent in such
importing country and no requirement for obtaining a compulsory licence
there.42 The 2005 Act therefore seeks to rectify this by adding that an exporter
can resort to section 92A where the importing country “has by notification or
38

Patents Act, 1970, § 90.

39

Patents Act, 1970, § 87, omitted by Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002. Since the 1970
regime provided only ‘process patents’ in the case of pharmaceutical inventions, it was not
too surprising that this compulsory licensing provision was hardly ever invoked by generic
manufacturers.
40

See generally SHANTI KUMAR, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COMPULSORY LICENCE AND LICENCE OF RIGHT
(1975).
41

WTO General Council, The Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/540.doc.
42

In fact, most of the countries that have little or no manufacturing capacity are LDC (LeastDeveloped Country) members that have time till 2016 to introduce product patents for
pharmaceuticals. It is therefore absurd to expect any existing patents on pharmaceutical
inventions in these countries in the interim.
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otherwise allowed importation of the patented pharmaceutical products from
India”.43
3. Procedural Changes
The general compulsory licensing procedure under Chapter XVI states
that in most cases, a compulsory licensing application can be entertained only
if negotiations towards a voluntary licence have not borne fruit within a
reasonable time period. In order to prevent patentees from dragging on
voluntary negotiations to the detriment of applicants, the Act caps a
‘reasonable’ period of negotiations at six months.
F. Government Use
Most patent regimes provide that, under certain circumstances, the
government is entitled to use an existing patent (commonly referred to as
‘government use’ provisions). The 2005 Act expands the scope of ‘government
use’ provisions in some respects and reduces it in others. Thus, sub-clause (iv)
has been added to section 2(h) of the old act to include any ‘institution wholly
or substantially financed by the Government’ within the ambit of a
‘government undertaking’ that can avail itself of a patent under the
‘government use’ provisions spelt out in Chapter XVII. However, the Council
for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), a premier science research
institution, has now been excluded from the ambit of the term ‘government
undertaking’. This, perhaps, is in recognition of the fact that CSIR has been
patenting extensively and is a private player in several respects.44
G. The Bolar Exception
The Indian patent regime encapsulates what is commonly referred to as
the Bolar exception45 - an exception that allows generic manufacturers to start
43

Patents Act, 1970, § 92A.

44

CSIR filed 184 patents with the Paris Convention Treaty (PCT) countries in 2002 alone,
tying for the number one spot in this field with Samsung. Samsung Finds its Match in CSIR,
H INDU B US . L INE , Jul. 27, 2003, http://www.blonnet.com/2003/07/27/stories/
2003072701380100.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2005).
45

This exception was named after a US case, Roche Products Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co. Inc., 733
F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), in which it was held that the ‘experimental use’ exception under
US law was not broad enough to permit Bolar to develop and submit a generic product for
regulatory approval before the expiry of Roche’s patent. The Hatch-Waxman Act in the US,
which introduced such an exemption favouring generic companies, was a response to this
ruling.
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producing a patented drug in limited quantities during the period of the patent
in order to collect data to be submitted to a drug approval authority. This
exception therefore enables generics to enter the market soon after a patent
expires.
Section 107A of the Patents Act (as amended up to 2002) excluded from
infringement “the act of making, using or selling a patented invention” for
the purpose of obtaining information to be submitted to a regulatory authority.
The 2005 Act expands this provision to bring even the act of ‘importing’
within its ambit. This will no doubt aid the efforts of generic manufacturers,
who are exploring all possible means to help mitigate the adverse consequences
of a pharmaceutical patent regime.
H. Parallel Imports
The earlier section 107A(b) provided that it was not an infringement to
import a patented product provided such import was from an exporter who
was “duly authorised by the patentee to sell or distribute the product”. The
2005 Act now makes such import easier by dispensing with the authorisation
required from the patentee - it only requires that the exporter of such patented
product be “duly authorised under the law to produce and sell or distribute the
product”.
Under this amended provision, it would appear that an Indian
pharmaceutical company could set up base in Bangladesh to manufacture and
export medicines to India.46 In the absence of a patent in Bangladesh and/or
any other law barring manufacture/exports, such company would presumably
be ‘duly authorised’ under the laws of Bangladesh to ‘sell or distribute the
product’.
The provision therefore is extremely broad in scope and may contravene
TRIPS. Article 6 of TRIPS states, in pertinent part, that “…nothing in this
Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual
property rights”.
46

As per paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration, a least developed country (LDC) member
such as Bangladesh has time till January 1, 2016 to introduce product patents for
pharmaceutical inventions. See WTO Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001), available at http://
docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/min01/DEC2.doc [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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The meaning of Article 6 is made clear by Article 5(d) of the Doha
Declaration which states: “The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights
is to leave each member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion
without challenge ...”
However, the above hypothetical example of an Indian company setting
up base in Bangladesh does not involve an ‘exhaustion’.47 There is no first sale
of the patented drug by the patentee - rather the drug is manufactured and
then exported by a third party. In short, the very essence of an exclusive right
to import mandated under Article 28 of TRIPS is affected.
III. SOME BROAD IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2005 ACT
A. Access to Medicines
Although the 2005 Act has made wide-ranging changes to India’s patent
regime, the most controversial provision is the one introducing product patents
for pharmaceutical inventions. Civil society proponents are concerned that
this would cause a steep rise in drug prices and adversely impact access to
important drugs. They argue that the available TRIPS flexibilities have not
been exploited appropriately and that adequate safeguards have not been built
in to ensure an affordable supply of medicines.48
The 2005 Act has a number of important safeguards built in to ensure
that the production of existing generic versions of drugs is not jeopardised. It
also has provisions to ensure affordable access to new drugs. Whether such
provisions would in fact be interpreted in a manner conducive to public health
needs remains to be seen. Some of the key provisions in the 2005 Act and
other related laws are discussed below.
47

“Exhaustion means that once a patent holder has sold a patented invention, the patent
holder has no further right to exclude others from subsequent use, including offering to sell or
distribute the patented invention. In essence, exhaustion presupposes that the patent owner,
unless there is an agreement to the contrary, implicitly licenses the subsequent use and resale
of a patented product upon first sale.” James Thuo Gathii, The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 292,
308 (2002).
48

According to Health GAP (Global Access Project), a US-based NGO that advocates the
cause of AIDS patients, human rights and fair trade, the 2005 Act fails “to utilise fully the
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1. Compulsory Licensing
As mentioned earlier, the provision of two new grounds for compulsory
licensing (one in respect of exports to countries that lack manufacturing
capabilities and the other in respect of the manufacture of drugs that are the
subject matter of mailbox applications49) would go a long way towards ensuring
that local industry can continue to manufacture at a cost lower than the
innovative drug company.
However, despite these new grounds, the new regime has done little to
ease the administrative and procedural bottlenecks that constrained the
invocation of compulsory licensing provisions under the old regime.50 Indeed,
a rather stark example of the procedural delays inherent in compulsory
applications is provided by a case under the old regime, where the compulsory
licensing application was dragged on all the way to the Calcutta High Court,
by which time the patent had almost expired.51
The 2005 Act has streamlined one such procedural hurdle by providing
that ‘voluntary negotiations’ with a patentee should be concluded within six
months.52 It could therefore well be the case that extensive provisions on
paper may not translate easily into practice. Further, contentious terms such
as ‘reasonable royalty rates’ (used in the context of the newly added compulsory
licensing ground to permit generic companies to continue manufacturing drugs
that are the subject matter of mailbox applications) could significantly slow
down the compulsory licensing process.
public health safeguards available to WTO member states under TRIPS, which were reaffirmed
by the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.” Health Global Access
Project, The Impact of India's Amended Patents Act to Access to Affordable HIV Treatment, at
http://www.healthgap.org/press_releases/05/020105_hgap_fs_india_ipr.pdf (last visited Nov.
1, 2005).
49

There are reportedly 8,926 applications in the mailbox. K.G. Narendranath, Patent Mailbox
Opens: Pfizer is Top Applicant, FIN. EXPRESS, Mar. 21, 2005, http://www.financialexpress.com/
fe_full_story.php?content_id=85782 (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
50

For an analysis of some of these procedural drawbacks, see Sudip Chaudhuri, TRIPS Agreement
and the Amendment of Patents Act in India, 37(32) ECON. & POL. WKLY 8 (Aug. 10, 2002).
51

Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade
Marks, A.I.R. 1978 Cal. 77.
52

A new explanation has been added to section 84(6) in this regard.
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It is nevertheless important to appreciate that possibly another reason
for the non-optimal use of the compulsory licensing regime under the old
regime was the absence of a well-developed local industry. Needless to say, in
the context of pharmaceutical inventions, this is not an issue, as India has a
well-developed local industry with extensive expertise and a readiness to exploit
compulsory licensing provisions.53 In the years to come, India is likely to provide
a fertile ground for the emergence of sophisticated compulsory licensing
jurisprudence, at least with respect to pharmaceutical inventions.
2. Retrospective Damages
The newly added proviso to section 11A of the Patents Act considerably
dilutes the monopoly granted to pharmaceutical patents that flow from mailbox
applications.
Section 11A(7) provides that patentees are entitled to claim damages
retrospectively from the date of publication of their patent applications, which
means that the moment a patent application is published (as opposed to a
patent being granted), a third party runs the risk of damages in case of
infringement. The Act, however, provides that such retrospective rights under
section 11A do not apply to pharmaceutical mailbox applications. This result,
coupled with the fact that the twenty-year patent monopoly term runs from
the date of the mailbox application and not from the date of grant, will reduce
the strength of drug patents that fructify from mailbox applications, a
consequence likely to benefit the continued production of generics at low
prices.54
Therefore, the failure to grant retrospective remedies to mailbox
applications, coupled with making them automatically susceptible to
53

It has to be borne in mind that prior to the 2005 Act, only process patents were available
for pharmaceutical inventions. Generic companies were able to work around such processes
with ease, without resorting to any form of licensing, whether compulsory or voluntary. Also,
very few processes were actually patented, since the term of protection was a mere seven
years and such processes could anyway be designed around with ease. See Shondeep Banerji,
Who Controls Domestic Law-Making? The TRIPS Agreement and the Indian Intellectual
Property Regime, Address at the Political Studies Association UK 50th Annual Conference,
London, UK (Apr. 10-13, 2000), available at http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/2000/
Banerji%20Shondeep.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2005).
54

For a more detailed treatment of this issue, see Shamnad Basheer, Of Generics, Pharmaceutical
Patents and the Countdown to 2005: A Note To Policy Makers, ECON. TIMES, Sep. 26, 2004,
http://www.patentmatics.org/pub2004/pub11a.doc (last visited Oct. 11, 2005).
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compulsory licensing provisions, will ensure that the supply of existing generic
drugs at affordable prices is not unduly hampered. To a limited extent, generic
manufacturers could also avail of the research exemption55 and the wide Bolar
provision in section 107A.56
3. The Patentability Threshold
The question of whether the new regime will have an impact on access
to new drugs is more vexed. This will depend significantly upon the scope of
patentability of pharmaceutical inventions. Notwithstanding calls by civil
society to restrict the patentability of pharmaceutical inventions to only new
chemical entities (NCEs),57 no such express limitations were introduced.58
However, this does not automatically mean that all such substances (including
new chemical entities, formulations, new drug delivery systems etc) will merit
patent protection. Rather, the more rigorous requirements for ‘inventive step’
introduced by the 2005 Act and the expansive ‘new use’ exclusion could help
in curbing new grants.59 Indeed, as argued earlier, a very strict reading of the
term ‘efficacy’ could result in very few patents for incremental pharmaceutical
innovations that rely on new forms of existing substances.60
55

Section 47(3) encapsulates the ‘experimental use’ exception in the Indian context and
provides that a patent may be used by any person ‘for the purpose merely of experiment or
research including the imparting of instructions to pupils’. This exception appears to be fairly
wide, but its ambit is yet to be tested in a court of law.
56

See discussion supra Part IIG.

57

See B.K. KEAYLA, NATIONAL WORKING GROUP ON PATENT LAWS, PATENTS AMENDMENT
ORDINANCE 2004: A CRITIQUE 1 (2005) (“Pharmaceutical patentability should be restricted
only to new chemical and medical molecules/entities. This will help exclusion of frivolous
claims”).
58

However, the government has constituted a technical committee to determine whether
restricting the grant of patents for pharmaceutical substance to only new chemical entities
(NCEs) would be in compliance with TRIPS. Technical Panel to Look into IPR Issues, FIN.
EXPRESS, Apr. 5, 2005, http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=87046
(last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
59
60

See discussion supra Part IIC.

It is pertinent to note that a member of Parliament, Mr. Kharabela Swain, had, during the
Parliamentary debates, opined that patents should be given for ‘incremental innovations’ as
Indian scientists do not have the know-how or capital to come up with new chemical entities
but do have the know-how to make improvements. Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 37. The
term ‘pharmaceutical substances’ may also have been defined with the intent of curbing the

2005]

SHAMNAD BASHEER

35

Apart from the ‘new use’ exclusion, the Patents Act has several patent
eligibility or subject matter exclusions61 such as the ‘method of medical
treatment’ exception62 and the ‘product of nature’ exclusion.63 These could be
effectively used to limit the scope of protection to pharmaceutical inventions.
In this regard, it bears noting that the Patent Office has a well-entrenched
history of adopting a conservative approach towards patentability.64 Relying
on the Ayyangar Report and the mantra that fewer patents are conducive to a
more robust indigenous industry, the Patent Office has, in the past,
demonstrated a ‘policy style’ approach to the issue of patentability and denied
protection to several inventions that merited patents in other parts of the
world. Indeed this trend was discernible in as late as 2001, when the patent
office refused an application by Dimminaco AG (a Swiss biotechnology
company) claiming a method of producing a live vaccine on the ground that
the term ‘manufacture’ did not include a process that had a living substance
as its end product.65
Therefore, it is likely that patentability criteria and subject matter
exclusions will be interpreted by the patent office in a rigorous manner so as
to filter out inventions that do not represent a genuine therapeutic advance.
The patent office could draw from the experience of developed countries that
scope of patents granted to pharmaceutical substances. However, in the absence of a mention
of the term in the text of the legislation, the purpose of such a definition remains obscure.
61

The principle of ‘patent eligibility’ broadly refers to the requirement that a subject matter
for which a patent is sought be inherently suitable for patent protection, in the sense of
falling within the scope of subject matter that patent law prima facie exists to protect. The
term ‘patentability’, on the other hand, refer to those set of principles that inform the
requirements that must be satisfied for a patent eligible subject matter (i.e., an invention) to
be granted a valid patent. Principally they are the requirements of novelty, inventiveness
(non-obviousness), utility (industrial applicability) and sufficient description. See Justine Pila,
Bound Futures: Patent Law and Modern Biotechnology, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 326, 341-356
(2003).
62

Section 3(i) excludes “any process for the medicinal, surgical, curative, prophylactic,
diagnostic, therapeutic or other treatment of human beings” from patentability.
63

Section 3(c) excludes the “discovery of any living thing or non-living substances occurring
in nature” from patentability.

64

See generally Shamnad Basheer, ‘Policy Style’ Reasoning at the Indian Patent Office, 3 INTELL.
PROP. Q. 309 (2005).
65

Dimminaco AG v. Controller of Patents and Designs, (2002) I.P.L.R. 255 (Cal). See also id.
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have strictly applied patentability criteria in some cases to prevent
‘evergreening’. For example, SmithKline’s secondary patent on a polymorph
of cimetidine, granted approximately five years after the original patent, was
invalidated in the UK and other countries on the grounds that such a
polymorph could not be considered ‘novel’ - i.e. it was inevitably obtained by
applying the process already claimed in the original patent.66
It is pertinent to note in this context that Article 27 of TRIPS stipulates
that “patents shall be available for any inventions… provided that they are
new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”67
This leaves some flexibility in the hands of member states to define these
patentability criteria in a manner that suits their specific national interests.68
Member states have, in fact, refined patentability criteria in the context of
specific fields of technology, taking into account the unique concerns posed
by such technologies.69 For example, in 2001, the revised utility guidelines
formulated by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) were
66

SmithKline and French Laboratories Ltd v. Evans Medical Ltd [1989] FSR 561. But see
TREVOR COOK ET AL., PHARMACEUTICALS, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 86, 89 (1991). See also
Dow Chemicals Application (unreported - SRIS O/179/83) and Shell International’s
Application (unreported - SRIS O/187/83) (rejecting claims to optically active isomers as
obvious because the improved properties were not unexpected and there was either an
expectation or it was predictable that this would be so).
67

A footnote states: “[F]or the purposes of this Article, the terms ‘inventive step’ and ‘capable
of industrial application’ may be deemed by a Member to be synonymous with the terms
‘non-obvious’ and ‘useful’ respectively.”
68

In the opinion of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR), “[T]here is
ample scope for developing countries to determine for themselves how strictly the common
standards under TRIPS should be applied and how the evidential burden should be allocated.”
The CIPR recommends the application of strict standards of novelty, inventive step and
industrial application or utility and asks developing countries to consider higher standards
than those currently applied in developed countries. COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 114, 123 (2002),
available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf
(last visited Nov. 1, 2005) [hereinafter CIPR Report].
69

This is normally done through ‘examination guidelines’ to be followed by the patent offices
of member states. In the context of pharmaceutical inventions, see Patent Office, Examination
Guidelines for Patent Applications relating to Medical Inventions in the UK Patent Office' (March
2004), available at http://www.patent.gov.uk/patent/reference/mediguidlines/claims.htm
(last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
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targeted towards biotechnology inventions.70 It is also pertinent to note that a
provision has been enacted in Germany to ensure that the patent monopoly
on a gene sequence is limited to the specific function disclosed and not to all
functions.71
4. Opposition Mechanism
Apart from this, the robust opposition mechanism (pre-grant and postgrant) could be leveraged to filter out frivolous patents. Some mailbox
applications have already been challenged under the pre-grant opposition
procedure. Thus, for example, Natco Pharma Ltd, an Indian pharmaceutical
company, has opposed an application by Novartis India Ltd pertaining to the
anti-cancer drug imatinib mesylate on the ground that it lacks novelty.
According to Natco, the Indian patent application merely claims a crystal
form (beta) version of a drug that was already known in 1993.72 This challenge
70

See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66(4) Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/utilexmguide.pdf. These guidelines require
that an applicant assert a specific, substantial and credible utility for the claimed invention.
These guidelines owe themselves to the difficulty in determining whether certain
biotechnology-related inventions, such as those covering genes or proteins, really have any
industrial application. Often any such application is not evident from the invention itself.
Such a requirement is now to some extent also being applied by the EPO. See, e.g., EPO
Opposition Decision revoking EP0630405 (ICOS Corporation) (Jun. 20, 2001) (unreported),
cited from CIPR Report, supra note 68, at 117. In relation to these guidelines, the CIPR
Report notes:
It is to be hoped that this new standard will prevent patents being granted on inventions for
which only a speculative application is disclosed, but it may be that it does not go far enough and
the impact of the new Guidelines will therefore need to be closely monitored. Developing countries
providing patent protection for biotechnological inventions should assess whether they are
effectively susceptible to industrial application, taking account of the USPTO guidelines as
appropriate.
CIPR Report, supra note 68, at 117.
71

An amendment approved by the German Parliament in 2004 limits patent protection on
human gene sequences to ‘disclosed functions’ at the time of the patent application, i.e. a
patent on a human DNA sequence used for a specific function would not cover a second
function discovered later by another researcher using the same DNA sequence. Ned Stafford,
German Biopatent Law Passed, S CIENTIST, Dec. 10, 2004, available at http://www.thescientist.com/news/20041209/01/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2005).
72

Other grounds for opposition include the fact that the application falls within the subject
matter exclusion under section 3(d), as it claims a new form that does not show increased
efficacy and also that the claimed invention does not involve an ‘inventive step’. Press Trust
of India, Natco Opposes Novartis’ Patent Claim, at http://inhome.rediff.com/money/2005/jun/
20natco.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2005).
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is bound to create considerable interest, as Novartis already owns an exclusive
marketing right73 over this drug (which it sells under the name Glivec) and
has injuncted several generics on the basis of this exclusive marketing right.74
5. Price Control/Competition Regime
Fears that the price of patented pharmaceutical inventions may spiral
also fail to take into account price control mechanisms and the newly instituted
competition regime in India.
When India passed its Patent Act in 1970, it also instituted a Drug Price
Control Order (DPCO) under the Essential Commodities Act of 1955 to
control the price of drugs and ensure access to the general pubic.75 Under this
order, prices of bulk drugs and their formulations were fixed by the government
as per a specified formula that allowed a 100% margin on ex factory cost.
Price changes of the remaining drugs were also to be monitored.
However, over a period of time, as a result of sustained lobbying by the
Indian pharmaceutical industry, the number of drugs listed in the DPCO fell
from 347 in 1979 to 76 in 1995.76 A new pharmaceutical policy in 2002 that
sought to relax controls even further was challenged on the ground that, under
the policy, certain life-saving drugs had the potential of being excluded from
73

In accordance with Article 70.9 of TRIPS, Chapter IVA of India’s Patent Act (which has
now been deleted by the 2005 Act) provided that till such time as a product patent regime
for pharmaceutical inventions was established, limited rights known as ‘exclusive marketing
rights’ would be granted to inventions that met certain criteria - the applicant had to have a
patent issued in a foreign country and have procured marketing approval from the relevant
authority in that country as well as from the relevant authority in India. As the name itself
suggests, the crux of this concept is a limited right to exclusively market the drug or medicine
in question. The exclusive marketing right lasts five years or until the issuance or rejection of
a patent (§ 24B, Patents Act, 1970). Out of 17 applications filed for the grant of an EMR
during the period in which the mailbox system was functional, only four were granted. See
Archa Saran, A Changing Regime: India's Tryst with January 1, 2005, 38 I.P.B.A. J. 17, 21
(2005).
74

See SUDIP CHAUDHURI, TRIPS AND CHANGES IN PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT REGIME IN INDIA 7
(Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta, Working Paper No. 535, Jan. 2005).
75

See R. Gupta, TRIPS Compliance: Dealing with the Consequences of Drug Patents in India, 26
HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 599, 608 (2004).
76

Siddarth Narrain, A Life Saving Order, F RONTLINE , Jul. 17-30, 2004, http://
www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2115/stories/20040730004110300.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
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the DPCO. The challenge made its way to the Supreme Court and is yet to be
resolved.77
Going by this history, one is prone to be a little sceptical of the role of
price control in India. However, there are indications that, in view of the
2005 Act and its expected impact on prices, the government is considering
strengthening the price control regime to increase competition and ensure
affordable medicines to the general public. To this end, a new Drug Pricing
(Regulation & Management) Act is being considered.78 The proposed Act
would, while retaining the DPCO within its ambit, have additional provisions
such as end-to-end price monitoring and negotiated settlement of prices of
new/patented drugs. It would also lay emphasis on cutting promotional expenses
that contribute substantially to the price of the drug.
The Competition Act, 2002 was brought in to replace the earlier
Monopolies and Restrictive trade Practices (MRTP) Act, 1969.79 Modelled
on the lines of the EC competition regime,80 it is possible that case law under
the EC regime that places a check on abusive practices by intellectual property
owners could be transposed to India as well. In particular, section 4 of the
Act, which prohibits an enterprise from abusing its dominant position, mirrors
the prohibition in Article 82 (ex Article 86) of the EC Treaty.81 It provides
77

Union of India v. K.S. Gopinath, S.L.P.(C) No. 3668 of 2003. This is an appeal from a
lower court ruling that had stayed the operation of the new policy. Although the Supreme
Court granted leave in the matter, it is still to render any decision or pass any orders. The net
result is that the stay on the policy granted by the lower courts continues to be operational.
See SC Concern Over Non-Inclusion of Essential Drugs, HINDU , Aug. 2, 2003, http://
www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2003/08/02/stories/2003080204201300.htm (last visited Oct.
28, 2005).
78

K.G. Narendranath, DPCO May be Retained in New Drug Pricing Act, FIN. EXPRESS, Aug, 1,
2005, http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=98022 (last visited Oct.
29, 2005).
79

Only some of the provisions of this Act have been brought into force (sections 1, 2, 7-17,
22, 23, 36 and 49-65 have come into force by virtue of Notifications Nos. S.O. 340(E) and
S.O. 715(E) dated March 31, 2003 and June 19, 2003 respectively).

80

See generally A. Viswanathan, From Commanding Heights to Competition: A Comparative
Analysis of India’s Competition Act 2002 with UK/EC Law, 14(7) INT’L. COMPANY & COM. L.
REV. 229 (2003) (comparing the Indian and EU regimes).
81

Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 Mar. 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3
(Treaty of Rome).

40

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 1

examples of conduct that amount to an abuse of a dominant position and
includes “[t]he imposition of an unfair or discriminatory condition or price in
the purchase or sale of goods or services, including predatory prices except
where adopted to meet competition”. A similar provision in the EC has been
interpreted as proscribing high monopolistic prices.82
B. Spurring an Innovation Culture in India
The multinational pharmaceutical industry argues that a product patent
regime is essential for encouraging R&D in new drugs and catapulting the
domestic industry into the innovative drug sphere. It needs to be noted however
that basic reverse engineering skills (organic chemistry skills) are different
from the skills required to arrive at new drugs (medicinal chemistry skills).83
Besides, the costs of researching upon and introducing a new drug into the
market are colossal.84 It therefore remains to be seen whether incentives
through a patent regime will achieve the desired results and whether Indian
companies will be able to compete with global multinational companies on
this turf. A commentator rightly notes that till recently, the emphasis has
been “mainly on building a system of production and not on a system of
innovation”.85
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This possibility was first acknowledged by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Sirena v.
Eda, [1971] C.M.L.R. 260. Later cases include United Brands Co. v. Commission, [1978] E.C.R.
207, and British Leyland plc v. Commission, [1986] E.C.R. 3263.
83
See S. Subramaniam, Pharmaceutical R&D in India: Addressing the Emerging Model of
Drug Innovation, Address at Chatham House Conference, London, UK (Feb. 1, 2005),
available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/conferences/proceedings/subr0105.ppt (last
visited Oct. 29, 2005).
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The current average capitalised cost of developing a new drug is estimated to be US$ 870
million. See generally J.A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003). This estimate has been criticised as not
representing “…what companies actually spend to discover and develop new molecular
entities. It includes the expense of using money for drug research rather than other investments
(known as the ‘opportunity cost of capital’).” Public Citizen, Critique of the DiMasi/Tufts
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reform/drug_industry/articles.cfm?ID=6532 (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
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PRODUCT PATENT PROTECTION AND EMERGING FIRM STRATEGIES IN THE INDIAN PHARMACEUTICAL
I NDUSTRY 30, available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/
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However, over the last couple of years, Indian firms have been engaging
in incremental modifications of pharmaceutical products developed in foreign
(mainly Western) countries.86 Such modifications or incremental innovations
that cater specifically to the public health needs of India (such as new drug
delivery systems and formulations that are created to withstand tropical
temperatures) are of immense value. 87 An excellent example of such
incremental innovation is that of Wockhardt Ltd., which developed humidityresistant salt forms and isomers of known anti-microbial substances. The
original compounds had been patented by the Otsuka Pharmaceutical
Company as potential antimicrobial agents against bacteria that were resistant
to conventional antibiotics such as penicillin, ampicillin and streptomycin.
The patented salts have better solubility characteristics and greater stability
in the presence of high humidity climates than the original patented active
substance.88 It is likely that the new regime will, at the very least, incentivise
these kinds of incremental innovations - the extent to which it will do so will,
of course, depend on how the patent eligibility and patentability requirements
are interpreted by the Patent Office and courts.
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See CARSTEN FINK, HOW STRONGER PATENT PROTECTION IN INDIA MIGHT AFFECT THE BEHAVIOR

OR TRANSNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES 9 (The World Bank, Washington DC , USA,

Working Paper No. 2352, 2000) 9. A recent news item points out that “[d]omestic pharma
majors fear that the new negative list on patenting substances will discourage indigenous
research and development (R&D). Since they are far from launching a new chemical entity
of their own, some of India’s largest pharmaceutical companies are focusing on novel drug
delivery systems (NDDS) for the time being.” K.G. Narendranath & Ravi Krishnan, Long
Negative List of Patentability Discouraging Research and Development, FIN. EXPRESS, Sept. 12
2005, http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=98948 (last visited Nov.
1, 2005). On the basis of all these reasons, it is often claimed that the Indian industry is not
invention-based, aiming at the production of new chemical entities, but rather innovationbased, aiming at producing incremental modifications of existing drugs.
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The example of Ranbaxy is noteworthy in this regard - it came up with an innovative drug
delivery system for ciprofloxacin. The invention, sold as Cipro-OD, enabled a patient to take
the medicine just once a day (OD) and was successfully licensed to Bayer AG. See SAMPATH,
supra note 85, at 43.
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The new salt innovations have been patented: arginine salt forms (6,514, 986; 6,753,333);
specific isomers of arginine salts referred to as L-arninine salts (6,664,276) and optically pure
carboxylic acid salt forms (6,750,224; 6,608,078). World Intellectual Property Organization
Secretariat, Follow-on Innovation and Intellectual Property 13-14 (20 May 2005) (Submission
to the WHO’s CIPIH), at http://www.who.int/entity/intellectualproperty/sub missions/
Innovation%20&%20Intellectual%20Property%20WIPO.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2005).

42

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 1

It is also likely that a product patent regime will encourage global
multinationals to outsource some of their drug manufacturing and clinical
trials to India and enter into appropriate partnerships with Indian companies.89
C. TRIPS Implications
Despite the fact that the 2005 Act is purportedly India’s final step towards
TRIPS compliance, the TRIPS compatibility of some of its provisions may be
in dispute.
Article 27 of TRIPS states, in the pertinent part, that “… patents shall
be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place
of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or
locally produced.” The non-grant of retrospective rights to mailbox
applications, coupled with making them automatically susceptible to
compulsory licensing provisions, may violate Article 27 - mailbox applicants
could argue that, when compared with other fields of technology, they have
been discriminated against.
The WTO panel in the Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products case90 ruled that the term ‘discrimination’ was a “normative term,
pejorative in connotation, referring to results of the unjustified imposition of
differentially disadvantageous treatment”. Whether the above disadvantageous
treatment of mailbox applicants is an ‘unjustified imposition’ will depend upon
an assessment of public health concerns and affordable access to medicines in
India and the causal link between such concerns and the provisions that are
allegedly in contravention of TRIPS. It must be borne in mind that Article
27.1 is to be interpreted in the context of the Doha Declaration, paragraph 4
of which reads as follows:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent
Members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while
reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the
89

Manojit Saha, Drug Patent: A Viagra for Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, DECCAN HERALD,
Apr. 4, 2005, available at http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/apr42005/
93626200543.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2005).
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Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner
supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in
particular, to promote access to medicines for all.
Secondly, section 84(1)(c) of the Act, which provides for a compulsory
licence if the invention is not worked in India (‘local working’ provision),
could also arguably fall foul of Article 27 which, as mentioned above, prohibits
any discriminatory treatment based on whether products are imported or locally
produced. This issue is yet to be resolved by a WTO panel - an opportunity
was lost when the US voluntarily withdrew its complaint against Brazil, which
had a provision similar to the Indian one.91
While the TRIPS compatibility of the above provisions are not entirely
clear, the argument that the amended section 107A(b) dealing with parallel
imports contravenes Article 28 of TRIPS is a strong one.92 Since this section
is not limited to pharmaceutical inventions, any potential justification for
differential treatment in the context of pharmaceutical inventions will not
apply here.
D. A Stitch in Haste Leads to Provisions in Bad Taste
As is evident from the above discussion, some of the provisions introduced
by the 2005 Act could have done with more careful deliberation. Defining a
term (‘pharmaceutical substance’) that is not mentioned thereafter in the Act
cannot, even with an ample dose of charity, be attributed to anything other
than shoddy drafting. Definitions of ‘new invention’ and ‘inventive step’
introduced by the Act not only go against the grain of time-tested principles,
but lead to inconsistencies with other provisions in the Act.
These mistakes are not too surprising, given that most of the problematic
provisions were deliberated upon and introduced in less than three months between December 2004 (when the Ordinance was passed) and March 2005
(when a Bill was placed before Parliament). To a large extent, changes to the
Ordinance were made to appease the Left Parties. A case in point is the
91

See WTO Panel on Brazil - Measures Affecting Patent Protection, Report of the Panel on
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the United States, WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
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‘inventive step’ clause, which was copied verbatim from the list of
recommendations by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)),93
which in turn appears to be based on a report by a prominent peoples’
commission.94
A slower and more elaborate deliberation would have yielded better
provisions. At a time when the word ‘patent’ meant patent leather shoes to
most in India, the legislative effort was informed by a brilliant report from a
Committee that circumnavigated the laws of the world and took a call on
what they thought would best suit the needs of India.95 The success of the
generic industry today is testimony, albeit in some small way, to the brilliance
of their foresight. This report has in fact acquired an almost canonical status
in the patent office, which still relies heavily on it whilst determining
patentability.96
Contrast this with the present Act: legislative efforts began towards the
end of 2002 and did not even so much as merit a Parliamentary Committee
Report. 97 Rather, while debating provisions pertaining to the 2005
amendments, the government took repeated refuge in the fact that the issues
had already been discussed by a JPC (Joint Parliamentary Committee)
constituted for the purposes of the 2002 Amendments.98 As the CPI(M) rightly
puts it:
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We fail to understand how the deliberations of the JPC constituted to
consider the Second Amendment can now be cited as if it had the last
word on all matters relating to the Patent Amendments under consideration
at present. That JPC is now functus officio.99
The stakes being higher in 2005, one would have expected detailed
deliberation on the patent regime and a far more elaborate legislative exercise.
Indeed, as a New York Times editorial profoundly noted: “Seldom has India’s
Parliament considered anything of such global import.”100
The debates around the Bill were also characterised by a rather one-sided
focus on pharmaceuticals. It was largely forgotten that the removal of section
5 not only introduced product patents for pharmaceutical substances, but also
for other chemical substances including agrochemicals.
IV. CONCLUSION: WHITHER NATIONAL INTEREST?
The Patents Act in its final form is the result of extensive politicking,
lobbying and of course, compromise. With competing pressures from
multinationals, civil society, a communist coalition partner and an opposition
party that performed the most stunning volte face (objecting to a bill that it
had drawn up itself), the government performed the finest tightrope walk
ever witnessed in the annals of Indian intellectual property law making. To
top it all, it had to perform this delicate stunt within the contours of the
TRIPS/WTO framework.
This dexterous manoeuvring around competing interests certainly deserves
praise. However the net result of such a compromise and a hasty legislative
process is a lack of clarity in the law. The price for these deficiencies will, no
doubt, manifest itself in the years to come - in sharp contrast to the way that
a carefully deliberated policy in 1970 resulted years later in a generic industry
that became the pride of the nation.
As for the vexed question of the likely impact of the new regime on
access to medicines, it bears noting that the provisions, as they stand now,
leave sufficient scope for the continued production of some generics. Insofar
99
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AIDS Drugs Threatened, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2005, http://www.nytimescom/2005/03/05/
opinion/05sat3.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2005).
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as new drugs are concerned, the costs are likely to increase and in the absence
of a nationwide healthcare insurance system, the common man may have to
bear the brunt of the new regime. However, there are provisions in the patent
regime and other related regimes that could be interpreted in a manner as to
help keep the costs down. Whether these provisions would be so interpreted
to further public health concerns remains to be seen.

